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SZACOWANIE RYZYKA. KRYTYCZNA PERSPEKTYWA WOBEC 
SYSTEMÓW WCZESNEGO OSTRZEGANIA PRZED KONFLIKTAMI 
Streszczenie  
Systemy Wczesnego Ostrzegania przed Konfliktami (SWOK) tworzą analizy ostrze-
gawcze, mające na celu zwrócić uwagę decydentów na potencjalne kryzysy międzynaro-
dowe oraz uruchomić akcje prewencyjne. Dlaczego jednak w wielu przypadkach systemy 
nie spełniają swojego zadania? Niniejszy artykuł podejmuje się krytycznego przeglądu 
teorii wczesnego ostrzegania oraz koncepcji wyjaśniających ich niepowodzenia. Pozwoli na 
lepsze zrozumienie roli SWOK w zapobieganiu konfliktów oraz przybliży modele wyko-
rzystywania specjalistycznych ekspertyz na poziomie międzynarodowym. 
Słowa kluczowe: Zapobieganie konfliktom, Systemy Wczesnego Ostrzegania, nie-
powodzenia Systemów Wczesnego Ostrzegania 
Introduction 
Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS) are commonly associated 
with conflict prevention and preparedness to disasters. Mostly embedded 
in governmental and non-governmental international organizations they 
aim to produce a very specific type of risk assessment that allows for time-
ly responses to unwanted and threatening events (Zenko and Friedman 
2011). The underlying assumption of early analysis is that all threats de-
velop with time and incubate in a way that can be discerned, tracked, as-
sessed, and responded to in a timely manner. Thus the belief, that with 
enough knowledge and time people can avoid or at least mitigate dange-
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rous situations. With this principle in mind, governments and international 
organizations have spent substantial funds to develop technologies and 
methodologies of data analysis so that politicians can make educated deci-
sions about future policies and actions (See: Sullivan and Wirtz 2007).  
Nonetheless, in the wake of several interconnected international cri-
ses, including the Arab Spring, the Syrian conflict and the refugee crisis, 
the whole concept of early warning has been strongly contested 
(Heisbourg 2015; See: Martineau 2010; Noutcheva 2015). The main 
criticism is concentrated on the so-called warning-response gap: How 
does it happen that in spite of advanced knowledge, international com-
munity could not prevent some of the most tragic humanitarian crises? 
To what extend early warnings can be considered effective? Why deci-
sion makers do not always act upon the warnings? This paper addresses 
these questions, providing a critical review of the early warning concept 
and its practical application. In doing so, it will provide a better under-
standing of the specific nature the warning-response gap and expertise 
utilization in the high-level political environment. 
Conflict Early Warning System – basic concepts 
Early Warning System can be described as any initiative that focuses on 
systematic data collection, analysis, and/or formulation of recommendation, 
including near real-time risk assessment (Austin 2004: 2). It is a system 
that, in theory, is supposed to deliver effective information (i.e. warnings, 
risk assessments) in a manner that allows decision makers and individuals to 
prepare for and respond to dangerous situations (Matveeva 2006). Modern 
early warning systems can be traced back to the 1950s and the development 
of professionalized intelligence services. Throughout the Cold War period 
early warnings, including risk assessments and security prognoses, were 
considered as one of the most reliable and guarded products of intelligence 
communities (Davis 2006). Everything changed after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, when intelligence agencies laid off approximately 30% of their analyt-
ical staff (Jones 2007). This army of analysts quickly found a place in dif-
ferent types of employment, including private and non-governmental sector. 
This way, the mid 1990s marked the time, when early warning transformed 
from exclusively classified knowledge to more open source intelligence, 
available for everyone with access to the Internet (See: Gill and Phythian 
2006; Otto and Meyer 2012). This resulted in rapid proliferation of think-
tanks, NGOs and INGOs, which started to incorporate the systems into their 
portfolio. It generated a momentum for development of methodologies ap-




earth science, medicine, and many others (O’Brien 2010). Nowadays, risk 
analysis and early warning units exist in most security oriented governmen-
tal agencies; non-governmental organizations working on conflict preven-
tion, humanitarian aid, climate change, etc.; and financial corporations. 
Presently, early warning systems rely primarily on open source intelligence 
and encompass a dynamic network of actors, technologies and resources 
closely interlinked with each other (Choo 2009). 
This paper focuses on Conflict Early Warnings Systems (CEWS), 
which put emphasis on complex international crises, violent conflicts and 
man-made disasters. CEWS can be divided into several groups depending 
on the source of analysis, generation of the system and methodology. The 
first typology concerns the so called commissioned (governmental) and 
non-commissioned (non-governmental) early warning analysis. The com-
missioned analysis originate mostly in international organizations. Here, 
the United Nations and its various agencies, European Union, NATO and 
OSCE are considered as the biggest hubs of commissioned early warning 
analysis (Davies and Gurr 1998). International organizations produce very 
specific risk assessments crafted accordingly to their political purposes and 
organizational structures (See: Zenko and Friedman 2011). The non-
commissioned analyses, also called open source, are embedded in non-
governmental and international non-governmental organizations. It is the 
NGOs and INGOs that produce the majority of the global warning signals. 
They represent approx. 70% of the whole analytical input into the early 
warning systems worldwide (Alihodžić 2012: 59).  
Both types of early warnings have their positive and negative as-
pects. A commissioned analysis has much better access to the decision 
maker. It is also perceived as more reliable and up-to date as it usually 
feeds on information which are gathered with governmental resources 
(Phythian 2013). In that sense, the commissioned analyses have a higher 
probability of utilization at political level. On the other hand, non-
commissioned early warnings are believed to be much more responsive 
and diverse in terms of sources of information (Harff and Gurr 1998). 
They usually use local sources and networks to gather necessary intelli-
gence. The INGO-based early warnings also utilize a vast array of lob-
bing techniques to advocate for rapid responses and their own recom-
mendations. In that sense, they can be more effective in engaging multi-
ple political actors at both grass-root and high political levels.  
The second most popular typology focuses not on the organizational 
origin, but the method of data gathering. Kumar Rupesinghe offers to di-
vide early warning systems into three generations, depending on diversity 
of sources and origin of information (1992). The first generation of early 
warnings is considered the least diverse and advanced. It is placed outside 
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monitored zones feeding mostly on secondary data. The second generation 
amends this approach by utilizing field monitors, i.e. representatives of an 
organization temporarily located in the proximity of the monitored zones 
and responsible for gathering primary data (Alker, Gurr, and Rupesinghe 
2001). The third generation is placed directly within the conflict zone, 
building not only on secondary data but also human intelligence acquired 
in the field. It usually relies on locally collected information and diverse 
network of contacts, including NGOs, journalists and academics.  
The third differentiation refers to methodologies used to process early 
warning information. Alexander Austin proposes four methodological 
categories: quantitative, qualitative, mixed mechanisms, and networks 
(2004). Most early warnings systems utilize a mixed mechanism, linking 
quantitative prognostic analysis with qualitative risk assessments (Rusu 
2001). The idea is to provide decision makers and international communi-
ty with the most up-to date and comprehensive knowledge about crisis 
situations. Quantitative methodology is also used to create data sets, which 
are then re-used for further analysis. The last type of early warning meth-
odology is based on networks and redistribution of information via Inter-
net and other early warning systems. Austin also differentiates early warn-
ing systems in accordance to the specific activities they undertake: net-
working, lobbying, monitoring, model data analysis, and redistribution of 
information. Most INGO-based systems not only monitor crisis situations, 
but they also lobby for specific responses. As indicated in Table 1, a closer 
overview of most popular early warning systems shows that they do not 
limit themselves to one area of intervention or methodology. The most 
effective systems utilize the whole range of possibilities in order to ‘make 
a difference’ in terms of conflict prevention and crisis mitigation.  
Table 1. 
Early Warning 
System Activities Profile 








The International Crisis Group is probably the best 
known early warning system focusing on the advocacy 
for conflict prevention and monitoring activities. The 
ICG comprises field analysts who stay long term in  
a specific regions such as Central Asia, Africa, South 
America, especially Columbia and the Balkans. The 
analysts generate up-to-date, on-the-ground reports 
about the latest changes in the situation which are then 
processed at the offices in Brussels, Paris and Washing-
ton. From there, they are distributed to the board mem-
bers, comprised of former prime ministers, foreign 
ministers and advisors, who then lobby the recommen-













The Fund for Peace is one of the leading Early Warn-
ing Systems, monitoring weak and falling states.  
It employs a comprehensive approach to the early 
warning, engaging both grassroots and policy levels 
decision makers. The Fund has been present in over 
50 countries, lobbing for conflict prevention and 
networking leading regional and international organi-
zations, academics and peace journalists. One of its 
biggest accomplishments is an advanced early warn-
ing software - Conflict Assessment System Tool 
(CAST). It is a content analysis product that provides 
conceptual framework and data gathering methodolo-
gy for measuring conflict risk and humanitarian 
vulnerabilities. The Fund for Peace is responsible for 
the development of The Failed States Index, an annu-
al ranking of 177 countries across 12 indicators that is 







Minorities at Risk is an open accesses university-
based initiative focused on the prognosis of future 
violent rebellions instigated by groups who are most 
at risk. MAR studies the conditions under which  
a group can mobilize and start a rebellion. The project 
is not a traditional early warning system, as it does 
not provide a near real-time analysis and risk assess-
ment. However, it does indicate potential hotspots  
on the basis of history of lost political autonomy and 
active political, economic, and cultural, discrimina-








NIWS is a system designed to support NATO deci-
sion makers in crisis situations. It “provides warning 
of any developing instability, crisis, threats, risks, or 
concerns that could impact on security interests of the 
Alliance and monitors de-escalation of a crisis” 
(Kriendler 2006: 2). It feeds on the existing NATO 
intelligence capabilities such as International Military 









The Global Pulse Project focuses on monitoring of 
socio-economic impact of international crises on the 
most vulnerable populations. It is an UN-based ana-
lytical and technical monitoring platform, designed to 
collate existing UN data sets to improve early warn-
ing analysis concerning international crises and chal-
lenges to the poor. The project’s objective is to create 
a network of UN-based early warning technologies 
and develop new forms of data analysis, based on 







Country Strategy Papers are the essential to the EU 
early warning system. CSPs are prepared by the 
European External Action Service (conflict preven-
tion units and respective delegations) with an input  
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  from the Member States. At first, the analysis was 
designed to support the European Development Fund 
and the donor community but with time it changed 
into a risk assessment analysis. The standard Country 
Strategy Paper consists of 1) framework of relations 
between the EU and the country of interest; 2) coun-
try diagnosis; 3) assessment of past and present coop-
eration; 4) strategy for future actions. The latest 
edition of the papers covers 141 countries. 
(Source: International Crisis Group Webpage 2016; Fund for Peace Webpage 2016; 
Minorities at Risk Webpage 2016; Global Pulse Project Webpage 2016; European Exter-
nal Action Service Webpage 2016; Kriendler 2006)  
A number of international organizations, INGOs, and governments 
embraced conflict prevention as a priority objective and invested consid-
erable resources into creating capabilities for early warning and response 
(Beswick 2012; Rasmussen 2001; Zenko and Friedman 2011). Yet, the 
effectiveness of the system and the direct link between analysis and po-
litical action still needs to be discovered. Even the system, which is ca-
pable of the most accurate risk assessment, is useless unless there is an 
effective model of its utilization at political level. A substantial body of 
literature claims to have identified “missed opportunities” and gaps in 
the global conflict prevention framework (De Franco et al. 2011; Zart-
man 2010). However, the research on conflict prevention has not con-
tributed substantially to global peace efforts to the extent it supposed to. 
As David Nyheim claims in his analysis of the international response to 
Rwandan genocide – today’s world is no better prepared to handle geno-
cides and international crises than it was all these years ago (Alker et al. 
2001).  
Early Warning - Response Gap 
The link between knowledge and policy making theoretically ap-
pears to be straightforward - a good analysis delivered in an accessible 
form to policy-makers, results in a good policy-making based on relevant 
research findings and accurate recommendations (McLean, Patterson, 
and Williams 2009). However, the reality suggests otherwise. The prob-
lem of responsiveness to early warnings is closely connected to one of 
the most important questions in the field of conflict prevention – how to 
unpack political will (Dabelstein 1996; Harff and Gurr 1998)? There 
have been several important findings that brought social scientists closer 




themes. The first one is technical, connected to the manner of how early 
warning analysis is produced and delivered to the decision makers. The 
second theme is related to socio-psychological aspects of political action, 
focusing on the way warnings are framed and perceived by politicians 
and their constituents. 
Contemporary early warning does not only comprise of analysis and 
prognosis but also contains certain “technical features” that are supposed 
to make early warning analysis more usable for decision makers. An 
example of such a feature is policy guidelines included in early warning 
analysis, so that “warnees” would have an idea about risks and options 
for intervention (Davies and Gurr 1998). The purpose of such recom-
mendations is to give a clear signal of who, how, when and under what 
circumstances should intervene in order to prevent or mitigate a crisis 
situation (Matveeva 2006: 16). Additionally, such recommendations are 
supposed to be effective and at the same appealing to decision makers’, 
linking knowledge with practice and generating actual political respons-
es. As Adelman and Surkhe put it, early warning is supposed to be a tool 
for policy making, something that not only facilitates but generates polit-
ical action (1996).  
In reality, it is extremely difficult to craft a plausible warning with  
a set of policy recommendations. The very notion of warning implies not 
only superior knowledge on the part of the communicator of warnings, 
but also the assumption that the communicator knows what the recipient 
‘needs to know’ and what the recipient ‘should do’, that is, the ‘warner’ 
is acting in the best interest of the’warnee’ or alternatively in accord-
ance with overriding universally accepted normative principles (Meyer 
et al. 2010). The task becomes even more difficult looking at the level of 
high politics, where a policy maker may be influenced by a series of 
factors including personal preferences, domestic politics, organizational 
interests, or his conception of threat and security (Walraven 1998).  
In that respect, two fundamental theories were introduced in the early 
stage of research on warning-response gap – strategic targeting and pro-
cess link theories. Strategic targeting theory is built on the assumption that 
the greater familiarity early warning analysts have with policy making 
mechanism, the easier it will be to write warnings intended for specific 
responses by those mechanisms, and more likely it will be for policymak-
ers to match these warnings to the mechanism they control (Davies and 
Gurr 1998: 230). At the same time, the theory indicates that such a model 
is applicable only if advanced inter-organizational information sharing and 
communication mechanisms are in place. It assumes that the “warner” and 
“warnee” operate in the same security environment, within one state, alli-
ance or organization – which is not always the case.  
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Process link theory, on the other hand, introduces more user-oriented 
model of analysis making, putting more responsibility on the shoulders 
of analysts and knowledge producers. Thus, in order to overcome the 
warning-response gap it proposes to provide dynamic conflict profiles 
that explain indicators of political instability in relation to existing prio-
rity focal points in conflict prevention mechanisms (Davies and Gurr 
1998: 232). The process link theory suggests that crisis situation should 
be sliced into priority sectors and handled or linked to the respective 
institutions responsible for targeted area of intervention (Meyer et al. 
2010). In that respect, early warning reveals itself not as a singled out 
report but the whole network of sub-analysis specializing in relevant 
policy areas.  
In the socio-psychological approach warning-response gap goes be-
yond levels of accuracy, organizational settings or access to decision 
makers. According to Meyers, the reasons hiding behind the gap and 
political inertia may be much more mundane. He points out that analyz-
ing the dynamics of potential conflict does not tell you how to make  
a convincing case for action (Meyer 2005). Early warning providers have 
to take into account several additional factors such as differences be-
tween “potential responders with regard to their policy priorities and risk 
appetite, their respective instruments for preventive action (including 
costs and lead-time), their personal and institutional political agendas as 
well as electoral cycles ” (Meyer et al. 2010: 250). Analysts and decision 
makers belong to different communities, speak different “languages” and 
have different interests (Whittall 2010). For most of the time, early warn-
ing analysts and conflict prevention advocates do not understand the 
specifics of high-level politics and high-stake interests that influence 
them (Arnoldi 2009). Politicians, especially those who make decisions, 
weight and perceive risks differently. They often have to take under con-
sideration multiple interests that do not have to align with conflict pre-
vention actions (Goertz 2004).  
In fact, there is an impressive literature, on political action and in-
action. One of the best known theories is the so called by-stander effect. 
The theory suggests that political inaction can be explained by: lack of 
interest in the situation, intimidating circumstances, group members who 
enable each other’s inaction, and insufficient benefits of the intervention 
(Levine and Thompson 2004). Levine puts interests and motives on the 
top of the list using the dichotomies such as egoism vs. altruism as the 
main cause of inaction. The by-stander effect and its variations have 
been used to attempt explaining the lack of international response to 




cated, the Arab Spring as well as the refugee crisis raised all the red flags 
in the early waning community, yet nothing has been done to mitigate 
them (Martineau 2010). It has been suggested that the main international 
players, who did very little to deal with the upcoming crises, encouraged 
the political inaction of the whole international, and especially European 
community (See: Coen 2015; Heisbourg 2015; Novotný 2015).  
Meyer and Miskimmon, on the other hand, argue that political ac-
tions cannot be explained by simple question - Do we care about x? 
(2009). They are more relative and dependent on the situational priority 
of goals. In the regard the real question should be – “How much do we 
care about x in comparison to y and z and…?” (Meyer et al., 2010: 561). 
In this perspective, the interests of the potential or targeted intervener 
can be changed by domestic and international advocacy, emphasizing the 
importance of intervention and by framing a humanitarian crisis as  
a national or international security issue (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 
1998). That is why early warning systems often act as lobbing groups, 
trying to highlight the importance of interventions and responses to spe-
cific international crises. Such lobbing activities can exploit political 
agenda of a specific country or organization, security culture or concrete 
political interests (See: Princen 2011). Regardless, as a part of their lob-
bying activities, the systems aim to indicate immediate implications of 
political inactions and potential political and other costs to the targeted 
responders (O’Brien 2002). The issue with this approach is that the real 
attention is usually diverted from conflict prevention to negative implica-
tions of the crises (Zartman 2015). This often leads to providing early 
warnings when a crisis situation is fairly advanced and negative impact 
on the international community is evident. In such cases conflict preven-
tion turns into conflict management and early warnings act more as  
a tool for monitoring the development and potential escalation of the 
crisis, than an analysis that is supposed to initiate preventive measures. 
Conclusions 
Early warning analysis represents one of the most sophisticated tools 
for conflict prevention. It originated in intelligence services in order to 
become a widely utilized instrument among governmental and non-
governmental institutions. The sole purpose of early warning systems 
(private or governmental) is to take the claim of surprise from the deci-
sion makers’ hands and supplement it with a comprehensive and ad-
vanced security analysis. This however, on numerous occasions proved 
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to be problematic. The warning-response gap is evident and the history 
of intelligence failures, neglected international crises and genocides pro-
vided enough proof to show that international community and conflict 
prevention policies are far from perfect. 
In this regard, it would be easy to dismiss early warning systems as 
effective tools for conflict prevention. Nowadays, the majority of inter-
national actors concentrate much more on reactive policies, with primary 
dominance of crises management, instead of preventive actions. Experts 
and scholars have already indicated numerous technical flaws embedded 
in early warning analyses. The most outstanding issues can be narrowed 
down to technical and political problems that have rendered the systems 
ineffective. Sometimes early warnings are lost in the institutional archi-
tecture, informational system, or desktop of the decision maker. Some-
times, the analysis is rejected because it does not align with political 
interests. However, does it mean that early warnings are obsolete? 
There is little evidence showing that early warnings actually worked, 
because successes of conflict prevention are not as evident and spectacu-
lar as its failures. The systems struggle with numerous problems, but 
they are still an important element of humanitarian and conflict preven-
tion actions, which mitigate and alleviate human suffering all around the 
globe. It should be noted that even with overcoming the technical short-
comings, conflict prevention will always be dependent on political cli-
mate and willingness of decision makers’. Thus, even the most accurate 
and timed early warning analysis may be ineffective due to political rea-
sons. The research on intelligence and conflict prevention failures is still 
in its embryonic stage. What it requires is advanced empirical study on 
early warnings perceptions among high-level politicians, models of 
knowledge utilization in international organizations, early warnings sys-
tems’ networking patterns and lobbing techniques. The systems’ role in 
conflict prevention actions is still very much understudied and hopefully 
the future project will shed some light on early warnings systems and 
their role in the recent international crises. 
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